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Mentalizing is defined as the inference of mental states of fellow humans, and is a
particularly important skill for social interactions. Here we assessed whether activity in
brain areas involved in mentalizing is specific to the processing of mental states or can be
generalized to the inference of non-mental states by comparing brain responses during the
interaction with an intentional and an artificial agent. Participants were scanned using fMRI
during interactive rock-paper-scissors games while believing their opponent was a fellow
human (Intentional agent, Int), a humanoid robot endowed with an artificial intelligence
(Artificial agent, Art), or a computer playing randomly (Random agent, Rnd). Participants’
subjective reports indicated that they adopted different stances against the three agents.
The contrast of brain activity during interaction with the artificial and the random agents
didn’t yield any cluster at the threshold used, suggesting the absence of a reproducible
stance when interacting with an artificial intelligence. We probed response to the artificial
agent in regions of interest corresponding to clusters found in the contrast between the
intentional and the random agents. In the precuneus involved in working memory, the
posterior intraparietal suclus, in the control of attention and the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, in executive functions, brain activity for Art was larger than for Rnd but lower than
for Int, supporting the intrinsically engaging nature of social interactions. A similar pattern
in the left premotor cortex and anterior intraparietal sulcus involved in motor resonance
suggested that participants simulated human, and to a lesser extend humanoid robot
actions, when playing the game. Finally, mentalizing regions, the medial prefrontal cortex
and right temporoparietal junction, responded to the human only, supporting the specificity
of mentalizing areas for interactions with intentional agents.
Keywords: social cognition, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, fMRI
INTRODUCTION
“In considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find cer-
tain operations which we can explain in purely mechanical terms.
This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin
which we must strip off if we are to find the real mind. But then in
what remains we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on.
Proceeding in this way do we ever come to the “real” mind, or do we
eventually come to the skin which has nothing in it? In the latter case
the whole mind is mechanical.”
Alan T. Turing, 1950
Is the humanmindmechanical? This questionmirrors another
asked by Alan M. Turing, one of the founders of artificial intelli-
gence: “Canmachine think?” (Turing, 1950). In his article, Turing
introduced an imitation game to test whether artificial intelli-
gence can equal human intelligence, hence “think.” In this game,
a human judge communicates with two agents hidden in other
rooms through a teleprinter. One of the agents is a fellow human,
the other is an artificial intelligence, and the judge has to decide
which of the two agents is the computer. The artificial intelli-
gence “passes” the “Turing Test” if it can fool the judge into
believing it is the human. In that case the computer can repro-
duce the relevant aspects of humans’ intelligent conversation
using its computations (Turing, 1950). In contrast, the inability
of machines to pass the Turing Test, that is to imitate a human
being in a conversation, implies that our interactions with fellow
humans have something that can not be captured by an artifi-
cial agent, that philosopherDaniel Dennett called the “intentional
stance” (Dennett, 1987). In his view, no matter how complex the
computations an artificial intelligence can accomplish it will not
be intentional.
But how would we react if intentional and artificial agents were
indistinguishable, but we were aware of their nature? The current
experiment was designed to investigate whether we use the same
neural mechanisms, in particular in brain regions involved in the
processing of fellow humans’ mental states, when believing we
interact with a natural or with an artificial intelligence. It could
not be implemented as a free rolling conversation with humans
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and artificial agents, if only because today’s artificial intelligence
systems’ attempts to pass the Turing Test are still inconclusive.
But as our focus was on how laymen in computer sciences and
robotics think machines think, and not how the machine actu-
ally thinks, we were able to restrict the interactions to a highly
controllable environment: participants believed they played with
a fellow human or a humanoid robot endowed with an artificial
intelligence, while the interaction with both agents was effectively
similar.
A humanoid robot was used to provide embodiment to
the artificial intelligence to the otherwise disembodied game.
Humanoid robots are also interesting as a technology on the verge
of becoming commonplace. While recent advances have indeed
provided increasingly complex and interactive anthropomorphic
robots, little is known about how human social cognition mech-
anisms adapt to these new interactive partners (Chaminade and
Cheng, 2009). Research on how humans interact with these artifi-
cial agents is, therefore, increasingly important as human-robot
interactions will impact issues of public concern in the near
future, in particular when assistive technologies for education and
healthcare will be concerned (Billard et al., 2007; Dautenhahn,
2007; Mataric et al., 2009; Chaminade and Kawato, 2011).
Recent neuroimaging research focused on the effect of robots’
appearance and motion on brain activity (Chaminade et al.,
2010; Cross et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2011), emphasising the
consequences of artificial agents’ anthropomorphism without
informing the observers of the algorithms controlling their behav-
ior. Another line of research compared the neural bases of social
interactions using economic games played against a human to
the same games played against a computer (McCabe et al.,
2001; Rilling et al., 2004), but didn’t provide information about
the algorithm controlling the computer’s output. The computer
was considered as the low-level control for intentional human
behaviours. In one experiment a humanoid and a functional
robot were used to induce different stances in participants playing
the prisoner’s dilemma game (Krach et al., 2008), but the authors
didn’t explicitly induce the belief that any of these robots had been
endowed with a specific artificial intelligence.
In the present experiment, participants played a computer
version of the rock-paper-scissors game, as in Gallagher et al.
(2002), against a fellow human (Intentional agent, Int) or against
a humanoid robot (Artificial agent, Art), both agents actively
playing in order to beat the participants. The robot was presented
as endowed with an artificial intelligence developed to play the
game actively and efficiently by relying on a specifically developed
computer algorithm. In a control condition the opponent was
presented as a computer playing randomly (Random agent, Rnd),
as in Krach et al. (2008); its responses couldn’t be anticipated so
that no strategy could be developed to beat it. Importantly, the
games sequences, in terms of wins and losses, were prepared in
advance and exactly similar across the three opponents, so that
only the stance adopted by the scanned participant when playing
against the three agents, the fellow human, the robot endowed
with artificial intelligence and the random computer, changed.
Our hypotheses were two-fold. First, we expected that play-
ing against the intentional or the artificial agent would yield
similar responses in specific regions of the brain. As participants
were made to believe that both active opponents, but not the
random computer, followed a strategy, they attempted to under-
stand these strategies in order to increase the number of games
won, similar processes should be engaged when playing against
the intentional and artificial agents. Practically, when senso-
rimotor aspects of the game are removed by subtraction of
condition Rnd, both Int and Art should require similar cogni-
tive mechanisms, such as keeping track of the opponent games
(working-memory), attempting to find regularities in the pre-
vious games (problem-solving) and choosing the next response
accordingly (response selection), all functions subtended by the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Petrides, 2005). We, therefore,
predicted that clusters in the frontal cortex would respond sim-
ilarly to the two active opponents compared to the random
computer.
Second, as the adopted stance is supposed to differ depending
on whether one is interacting with a human or with an artifi-
cial agent, the cognitive and neural mechanisms recruited when
playing against these two opponents should yield differences, with
brain areas specifically involved in the interaction with each one.
Humans particularly developed social skills have been the focus
of intense investigations in functional neuroimaging, which have
revealed two mechanisms that play an important role. Motor res-
onance is the generalization of the finding of mirror neurons, that
discharge both when a macaque monkey performs an action and
when it sees another agent performing an action (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004), and it is believed to play a role in action per-
ception, action understanding, imitation, and social bonding in
human cognition (Chaminade and Decety, 2001; Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). At the brain level, the inferior parietal lobule
including the anterior intraparietal sulcus and the premotor cor-
tex are the main locations of motor resonance. No activity in these
areas was predicted in the present experiment provided that inter-
action with, and not observation of, the interactive agents was
investigated.
Mentalizing is the inference of the hidden mental states, such
as intentions, desires and beliefs, that cause intentional agents’
behavior, and it is particularly important for social interactions
(Frith and Frith, 1999). Its neural correlates include prominently
the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporoparietal junction
(Frith and Frith, 1999). Increased response in these regions (Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006) has been repeat-
edly reported for interacting with an intentional agent, including
in experimental settings similar to the one used here (Gallagher
et al., 2002; Krach et al., 2008). It was proposed that the medial
prefrontal cortex “supports a general mechanism for the integra-
tion of complex representations of possible actions and anticipated
outcomes [. . .] particularly relevant to the domain of social cog-
nition” (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Here we assessed whether
activity in these regions is specific to the processing of mental
states or can be generalized to the inference of non-mental hid-
den states. Response of the temporoparietal junction and medial
prefrontal cortex activated during the interaction with human
fellow was, therefore, examined during the interaction with the
artificial intelligence, characterized by hidden states that are not
intentional but computational. The finding of an activation in
mentalizing areas when interacting with an artificial intelligence
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would parallel the finding that motor resonance generalizes to the
perception of anthropomorphic robots (Chaminade and Cheng,
2009), implying that similar cognitive mechanisms are at play
when manipulating mental or mechanistic hidden states during
an interaction. Alternatively, interacting with an artificial intel-
ligence could engage areas involved in calculus and rule-solving
computations, in the left intraparietal sulcus (Simon et al., 2002)
and anterior part of the prefrontal cortex (Koechlin et al., 2003;
Badre, 2008), respectively.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen healthy male volunteers (mean age 21.5 years, SD
4.9 years), with no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases
according to self-report, gave informed consent and were indem-
nified 40C to participate to this fMRI experiment, that was
approved by the local ethics committee “CPP Sud-Marseille-1,”
approval number 2010-A00508-31. One participant was excluded
due to his inability to perform the task and excessive move-
ments. All were students in local universities and engineering
schools. Right-handedness was confirmed by the questionnaire of
Edinburgh (Oldfield, 1971).
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
The experimental paradigm used the game Rock-Paper-Scissors
similar to that used in Gallagher et al. (2002), and a briefing
procedure similar to that used in Krach et al. (2008). As sup-
port for the allegedly live interaction, participants were playing a
computerized version of the game (Figure 1): the three choices,
paper, scissors, and stone were presented on screen during a
“2–1–0” countdown, each frame lasting 2/3 of a second, and par-
ticipants were asked to respond during the “0” frame by clicking
on one of three buttons with the thumb, index or middle fingers
of their right hand, respectively. The key-response mapping was
kept constant to avoid the recruitment of attentional resources for
sensorimotor remapping during the experiment. The next screen
indicated the result of the game, with the participant’s response
on the left, the opponent’s response on the right, and a color
frame around each response providing the result of the game
(green for win, red for loss and yellow for tie). Series of five games
were played consecutively in a round against a given opponent,
and five rectangular markers at the top of the screen kept track of
games results as the round unravelled (–: not played, X: loss, +:
gain, O: tie). For each given 15 s round, a 2 s video before and
a 2.5 s video feedback after showed the opponent being played
against. Different videos were used for each individual game.
No video or image of the opponent was shown when the games
were actually being played. Three 9min functional runs, consist-
ing each of seven games against each of the three opponents,
for a total of 21 games against each opponent, were scanned.
Unbeknown to the participants, all games’ results and sequences
of videos were prerecorded in an experimental script in order
to provide an equal number of gains and losses across all oppo-
nents, spanning the entire spectrum of possibilities (from 5 wins
to 5 losses), according to their likelihood in a random sequence
of five games (in the script, an overall tie is four times more
likely—and happens four times—while 5 losses or 5 wins happens
only once). The experimental paradigm and the synchronisation
with fMRI recordings were accomplished with an ad-hoc LabView
8.6 program running on a National Instrument PXI-1031 chassis
computer.
PARTICIPANTS’ BRIEFING
All participants underwent an extensive verbal presentation of
the experimental setting and procedures in the control room
adjoining the MRI scanner. The three opponents presented to
the participants were the experimenter TC, described as a human
agent playing with the usual strategies of a human agent (hence
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. Each game of Rock-Paper-Scissors
consisted of a countdown, a response screen and a result screen, and
lasted 3 s. Five games were played for a round against one given opponent,
and each round was preceded by a 2 s video of the opponent (video framing)
and was followed by a 2.5 s video of the opponent providing a feedback on
the results of the game (video feedback).
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“Intentional agent” Int), a small humanoid robot endowed with
an artificial intelligence algorithm specially developed to attempt
to win the games by taking into account results of previous games
(hence “Artificial agent” Art), and a random number generator
embedded in a computer that only kept track of the results to cal-
culate a score at the end of each round of games (hence “Random
agent” Rnd). Participants were explicitly explained that as both
the intentional and artificial agents used strategies in order to win
a maximum of games they should also try to develop a strat-
egy to beat them. In contrast, as the random number generator
didn’t have any strategy, they shouldn’t be able to defeat it. After
this presentation they underwent 5 or 10 rounds of training for
the Rock-Paper-Scissors game on a test computer to familiarize
themselves with the motor requirements of the task.
Then, participants were shown the “game control room” in
which the three opponents would be localized during fMRI scan-
ning: the experimenter playing with a keypad similar to the one
used in the MRI setting, a humanoid Bioloid robot from Robotis
plugged to a computer which hosts the artificial intelligence algo-
rithm, that plays with three armmovements corresponding to the
three responses, and a computer providing the random responses.
They were further shown the webcam, at the centre of the table,
that would allegedly be used to provide them with live feedback
of the opponent before and after each round, and shown live
examples of what they would see for the three opponents. For
the human opponent, the video preceding the game was a gestu-
ral invitation to play, and the video following the game displayed
an emotional expression relative to the experimenter’s score; for
the robot opponent, the robot standing up, and arms movements
(up for victory, down for defeat); for the computer opponent, the
number 3 starting the countdown for the first game of the round,
and its score between −5 and 5. While all was presented to make
participants believe they were interacting live with the three oppo-
nents, all video stimuli were prerecorded in the exact same setting
prior to the experiment.
After fMRI scanning participants were given a questionnaire
about their habits in computer-related hobbies (use of internet,
of social networks, and of computer games) as well as questions
about their perception of the games they just played. In partic-
ular we asked to what extent they thought they were successful
against each of the three opponents, and whether they thought
they adopted an efficient strategy against each the three oppo-
nents, both on a 5-point Likert scale. Analyses of variance were
run on the Z-score transform of participants’ ratings for the
two questions to assess the effect of the agent. When an effect
of the agent was identified, three planned pairwise comparisons
between agents (Int-Rnd, Art-Rnd, Int-Art) were calculated.
MRI ACQUISITION
Data were collected with a 3T BRUKER MEDSPEC 30/80
AVANCE scanner running ParaVision 3.0.2 at Marseille Cerebral
Functional MRI centre. Participants lying supine in the scanner
were instructed to remain still during the course of the exper-
iment. Stimuli were projected on a mirror located in front of
participants’ eyes through a mirror and projector located in the
back of the scanner. Responses were recorded with a right-hand
5-digit ergonomic MRI-compatible keypad.
After a localizer ensured the participants were correctly posi-
tioned in the magnetic field, five scanning runs were performed.
First a fieldmap using a double echo FLASH sequence recorded
distortions in the magnetic field (FLASH, FOV 192 × 192 ×
192mm3, voxel size 3 × 3 × 3mm3, TR 30.0ms, TE 3.700ms,
α = 30◦). Three functional runs (EPI, FOV 192 × 192mm2, pixel
size 3 × 3mm2, 36 interleaved ascending axial slices and each
were 3mm thick without gap, TR 2400.0ms, TE 30.000ms,
α = 81.6, 232 repetitions, scanning time 9min 16 s), using the
same spatial parameters as the fieldmap, covering the whole-
brain parallel to the AC-PC plane, were recorded. Finally a
high-resolution T1-weighted 3D image was acquired for each
participant (MPRAGE, FOV 256 × 256 × 180mm3, voxel size
1 × 1 × 1mm3, TR 9.4ms, TE 4.424ms, α = 30◦).
fMRI DATA PROCESSING
The FieldMap toolbox in SPM8 was used to determine voxel
displacements in the EPI image. After discarding the first five
EPI images to allow for initial T1-equilibrium, realignment, and
unwarping procedures were applied to fMRI time series to cor-
rect for both the static distortions of themagnetic distortions with
the voxel displacement map obtained from the fieldmap and the
movement-induced distortions of the time series (Hutton et al.,
2002). The mean image created during realignment was coregis-
tered with the high-resolution anatomical image, that was nor-
malized to SPM8 T1 template, and the convolved normalization
and coregistration transformations were applied to the realigned
EPI time series. A 9mm FWHM Gaussian kernel smoothing was
applied to EPI images prior to statistical analysis.
In the single-subject analyses, rounds of interaction with each
of the three opponents were modelled as 15 s boxcar functions
blocks synchronised with the onset of the first countdown image,
and videos presented before and after each round of games were
modelled with 2 s and 2.5 s boxcar functions respectively, for each
of the three opponents. The condition regressors were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function and a high
pass filter with a cut-off of 128 s removed low-frequency drifts in
BOLD signal.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Contrast images corresponding to the main effect of the rounds
of interaction with each of the three opponents and for each of
the three recording sessions were used in a second-level repeated-
measure analysis of variance across the 18 participants, using
session as a repeated factor of no-interest. Contrasts between con-
ditions were thresholded at p < 0.05 family wise error (FWE)
corrected and extent k superior to 25 voxels (200mm3). When
possible anatomical localisations were performed using the
Anatomy toolbox in SPM8 (Eickhoff et al., 2007), otherwise using
Duvernoy’s brain atlas (Duvernoy, 1999). Renders on an aver-
age inflated brain were performed using surfrend for SPM8 and
freesurfer. Percent signal change was extracted in clusters taking
into account all voxels usingMarsBAR SPM toolbox implemented
in SPM8, and ANOVAs were computed using SPSS to assess
the effect of the opponent on percent signal change using ses-
sions as repeated-measures of no interest, as in the whole-brain
analysis. Planned pairwise comparisons between agents (Int-Rnd,
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Art-Rnd, Int-Art) were reported as highly significant (p < 0.001)
or significant (p < 0.05).
RESULTS
DEBRIEFING
For logistical reasons debriefing questionnaires were only
obtained in the last 12 of the 18 scanned participants. The main
observation is that, when considering responses to both ques-
tions, about their subjective feeling of success and of efficacy of
the strategy used, none of the participants gave the same rate for
the three opponents. Informal debriefing with the first six par-
ticipants indicated that they felt differences in their success rate
against the three opponents. Altogether individual responses thus
support that each participant perceived differently their success
and strategy efficiency against Int, Art, and Rnd.
Group ANOVA indicated no significant effect of the agent
being interacted with on the perceived success [F(2, 22) = 0.890,
p = 0.428], supporting the absence of a systematic perception
of gain or loss toward any of the opponents. On the efficacy of
the strategy being used, ANOVA revealed a marginally signifi-
cant effect [F(2, 22) = 3.553, p = 0.058]. Participants were more
confident (p = 0.040) about their strategy when interacting with
the human (Int) than the computer (Rnd). Pairwise comparisons
between Art and Int and Art and Rnd were both not significant
p > 0.1.
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF AGENTS
Repeated-measure whole-brain analysis of variance was used
to compute pairwise comparisons between the three agents
(Figure 2 and Table 1). The contrast Int-Rnd yielded response in
expected brain areas on the basis of our hypotheses, namely in the
frontal cortex (left superior frontal, middle frontal and precentral
gyrus, right medial prefrontal cortex), in the parietal cortex (pre-
cuneus bilaterally, left anterior and posterior intraparietal sulcus,
right temporoparietal junction) and well as in the anterior part of
the right thalamus.
FIGURE 2 | Lateral and medial brain renders (rendered with freesurfer)
showing activated clusters (p < 0.05 FWE corrected, k > 25 voxels) for
the contrast Int-Rnd.
Using the same thresholds, the contrast Art-Rnd yielded no
activated cluster. As activated clusters could be found with the
more lenient threshold p < 0.001 uncorrected, another approach
was used to check whether brain areas responded to the artificial
intelligence only with a more lenient threshold: the contrast Art-
Rnd (p < 0.001 uncorrected) was exclusively masked with the
contrast Int-Rnd (p < 0.001 uncorrected). No region was identi-
fied with this approach, supporting the conclusion that no brain
region responded specifically to the interaction with the artificial
intelligence.
Direct comparisons between the two allegedly interactive
opponents yielded only one cluster in the right temporoparietal
junction for Int-Art, included in the temporoparietal junction
cluster reported in Int-Rnd. No cluster survived at the thresholds
used for the reverse comparison Art-Int, nor for the comparisons
Rnd-Art and Rnd-Int.
REGION OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
To characterize brain responses to artificial intelligence, BOLD
percent signal change was extracted in all clusters identified in
the contrast Int-Rnd and the response to Art investigated with
ANOVAs and t-tests to test the hypothesis that similar neural
resources are used to play against the two allegedly active oppo-
nents (Figure 3). As expected from the selection of ROIs, there
was a highly significant effect of the agent [all F(2, 34) > 20, p <
0.001], and comparisons between Intentional and Random agents
were all highly significant (at p < 0.001). More interestingly com-
parisons between intentional and artificial agents were significant
in all ROIs (ps < 0.001) while the significance of the compari-
son between Artificial and Random agents depended on the ROI:
it was highly significant in the anterior intraparietal sulcus and
precentral gyrus (both p = 0.001), significant at p < 0.05 in the
precuneus and posterior intraparietal sulcus, in the left superior
and middle frontal gyrus and in the thalamus, and not signif-
icant in the medial prefrontal cortex (p = 0.105) and the right
temporoparietal junction (p = 0.207).
DISCUSSION
In this experiment we compared the effect of one’s beliefs about
the nature of the agent he is interacting with while all other
aspects of the interaction, in particular sensorimotor transforma-
tions, are controlled. The two actively playing opponents were
the experimenter with its intentional intelligence (Int) and a
humanoid robot endowed with an artificial intelligence algo-
rithm developed to win the game (Art). A third opponent, a
computer providing random responses which couldn’t be antic-
ipated (Rnd), was used as a control. Taken individually, each
participant considered that his strategy or success rate differed
between the three opponents, suggesting that he really believed
that there were three different opponents. However, there was
no significant effect of the agent on perceived success in group
analysis, suggesting there was no consensus on the perception
of gain or loss toward the opponents. In contrast, the adopted
strategy was considered better against the human than the com-
puter, in agreement with the information given in the briefing
that the human was using a strategy and could, therefore, be
beaten, while it was not possible to adopt a strategy against a
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Table 1 | Regions of increased BOLD response in comparisons between believing the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is being played against an
intentional agent (Int), an artificial agent (Art), and a random number generator (Rnd).
Location x y z T -score Extent (voxels)
INTENTIONAL AGENT—RANDOM AGENT
Left Superior frontal gyrus −24 10 62 9.26 203
Bilateral Precuneus −8 −64 52 8.96 636
Left Anterior intraparietal sulcus −46 −44 50 7.93 59
Left Precentral gyrus −34 4 44 7.97 143
Left Middle frontal gyrus −46 16 42 8.17 240
Left Posterior intraparietal sulcus −30 −70 38 8.04 210
Right Medial prefrontal cortex 4 42 34 8.71 234
Right Temporoparietal junction 56 −54 28 9.65 321
Right Anterior thalamus 6 −2 6 8.11 154
ARTIFICIAL AGENT—RANDOM AGENT
− − − − − − −
INTENTIONAL AGENT—ARTIFICIAL AGENT
Right Temporoparietal junction 56 −52 16 7.57 94
ARTIFICIAL AGENT—INTENTIONAL AGENT
− − − − − − −
Pairwise comparisons are reported at p < 0.05 corrected for family-wise error and extent superior to 25 voxels.
FIGURE 3 | Percent signal change (error bar: standard error) as a
function of the opponent extracted in all cortical regions
identified in Int-Rnd (see Table 1 and Figure 2). All pairwise comparisons
between Intentional agent and the other two opponents are significant at
p < 0.001 (not represented). Significant pairwise comparisons
between Artificial and Random agents are presented at
significant (∗p < 0.05) and highly significant (∗∗∗p < 0.001)
thresholds.
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random number generator. As feedbacks from all opponents were
controlled experimentally to be similar, these findings clearly
indicate that the induction by verbal briefing and the allegedly
live videos used during scanning worked efficiently. Local differ-
ences in brain activity observed between the three experimental
conditions are, therefore, undoubtedly related to differences in
the participants’ different stances when playing against the three
alleged agents.
INCREASED INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN-HUMAN
INTERACTIONS
The fMRI contrast between human playing with intentional intel-
ligence and random player yielded expected results, in the medial
prefrontal cortex, the left superior frontal, middle frontal and pre-
central gyrus, the precuneus and right temporoparietal junction
(Krach et al., 2008). As the briefing incited participants to actively
look for the opponent strategy when playing against the human
and the robot, our null hypothesis was that brain areas involved
in playing the game should respond similarly to the two active
opponents.
The dorsal precuneus reported here has been associated with
working-memory retrieval (Cabeza et al., 2002), and in particu-
lar when the content to be retrieved is highly imageable (Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006). Keeping track of previous games, depicted as
images for the three possible responses, during one round in order
to anticipate the forthcoming action by the opponent requires a
strong involvement of imagery-based working-memory. The pre-
cuneus may also be involved in changing the rules adopted to
win (Nagahama et al., 1999): the precuneus was activated when
a “wrong” feedback was provided in a card sorting task and the
sorting rule had to be adapted by focusing on another aspect of
the cards (“color” vs. “shape”). The posterior intraparietal sulcus,
that shows a similar effect of agents, is in the human homolog
of monkey’s lateral intraparietal area LIP (Sereno et al., 2001)
involved in eye movement (Simon et al., 2002) and in attentional
shifts (Sereno et al., 2001), and could participate together with
the precuneus, in orienting attention to the participant and the
opponent games results during a round. Keeping track of players’
responses and victories is essential to understand the rules behind
the opponent’s choices.
Frontal regions could be involved in other high-order aspects
of the competitive game grouped under the heading of executive
functions. One mechanism, the maintenance of a representation
of the stimuli for active processing according to the task at hand,
involves the middle frontal gyrus (Petrides, 2005), complemen-
tary to representing the stimuli in working-memory in the medial
parietal cortex (Cabeza et al., 2002). The exact function of the
superior frontal gyrus in executive functions is not well estab-
lished, but a lesion study confirmed it participates to domain-
independent working-memory (du Boisgueheneuc et al., 2006).
The finding of these areas in Int-Rnd could be explained by the
increased executive demands of interacting with an active oppo-
nent: “given the results of the previous games (working-memory)
and my knowledge about the nature of the opponent (adopted
stance), I anticipate that it is more likely to play scissors, eventually
stone, at the next game (problem-solving) and I should play stone to
win or avoid to lose (response selection).” Within this framework,
regions involved in the attentional and executive aspects of the
task should have been similarly activated for Int and Art, while
results indicate that parietal and prefrontal regions were more
activated when the opponent was the intentional than the arti-
ficial agent. Increased response in regions devoted to attentional
and executive functions when interacting with a peer compared
to an artificial intelligence signals an increased involvement in
the interaction. A cluster of activity in the thalamus was reported
when participants anticipated a social reward in a simple reac-
tion time task [6, 0, 3 in Spreckelmeyer et al. (2009), 6, −2, 6
here], supporting the idea that the increased involvement in the
task when playing against the intentional, compared to the arti-
ficial, agent is caused by the rewarding value of human-human
interactions (Krach et al., 2010).
MOTOR RESONANCE WHEN INTERACTINGWITH
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The two brain areas in which the difference between response
to Art and Rnd was highly significant in the ROI analysis were
the anterior intraparietal sulcus and precentral gyrus of the left
hemisphere. Both areas have been reported in previous experi-
ments of human and robot action observation (Chaminade et al.,
2010; Saygin et al., 2011), and discussed within the framework of
motor resonance. Motor resonance is the mechanism by which
the neural substrates involved in the internal representation of
actions performed by the self are also recruited when perceiv-
ing another individual performing the same action. Artificial
agents have been used to gain knowledge on how anthropomor-
phism affects neural markers of motor resonance (Chaminade
and Kawato, 2011), and we reported a similar response to observ-
ing a human or a humanoid robot in the right premotor area
(Chaminade et al., 2010) comparable to the left precentral gyrus
found here, and a large repetition priming effect in response to
an android’s actions in a left anterior intraparietal sulcus area
(Saygin et al., 2011), believed to play a specific role in the per-
ception of action goals (Hamilton and Grafton, 2006). In the
present experiment activity in these regions can’t be due to action
observation as no video feedback was given during the actual
games, but may be explained by the participants imagining his
or his opponent’s actions. As William James put it (James, 1890),
“Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree
the actual movement which is its object,” which could corre-
spond in the present experiment to a simulation of the opponent’s
actions, as activity depends on the nature of the agent being
played. Interestingly, the result, based on ROI analysis, that both
the increase from random to artificial and from artificial to inten-
tional agents are significant parallels the previous finding that
observing a robot performing an action induces a reduced motor
resonance compared to observing a human agent (Chaminade
and Kawato, 2011).
Alternatively, activity in a parietopremotor circuit in the left
hemisphere could be caused by higher attentional demands or
demands of response selection for Int than for Art. As in the
interpretation previously proposed for the parietal and lateral
prefrontal clusters, an increased involvement of participants when
interacting with the human than with the humanoid robot
endowed with an artificial intelligence would cause increased
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response in brain areas controlling attention and/or the motor
response. This interpretation is parsimonious in the sense that
it makes use of a conclusion already supported by the response
in other regions, namely a greater involvement in interactions
with an intentional compared to an artificial agent. Further
experiments are required to test whether the parietopremotor
circuit discussed in this section should be interpreted as sus-
taining motor resonance or attentional and motor aspects of the
interaction game.
NO INTENTIONAL STANCE AGAINST THE ARTIFICIAL AGENT
The medial prefrontal cortex was reported in Int-Rnd, though
in a more dorsal location that the paracingulate cortex reported
for the same contrast in a previous PET experiment using a
similar stone-paper-scissors interactive game to investigate the
intentional stance (Gallagher et al., 2002). The present cluster
was closer to the cluster reported in the left hemisphere for the
contrast between playing against a human and rule-solving in
Gallagher et al. (2002), while the rule-solving condition was more
similar, in terms of the stance adopted, to the present artificial
intelligence. The opponent responses were presented as depend-
ing on explicit mathematical rules in Gallagher et al. (2002),
while they were implicit in the present experiment. Moreover,
this was only a cover story in the present experiment, in which
all trials were truly random, but partly true in Gallagher et al.
(2002): three possible rules could be alternated and all runs
had a fully random sequence of trials (10 out of 30) in their
midst. It is possible that these differences in experimental con-
ditions or in the neuroimaging technique used (PET vs. fMRI)
explain the changes in the exact location of the medial prefrontal
cluster associated with adopting an intentional stance. Yet both
fall inside the same subdivision of the medial prefrontal cortex
as parcelled in Amodio and Frith (2006), the anterior rostral
medial prefrontal cortex, presented as specific to mentalizing,
that is, thinking about other people’s mental states. Furthermore,
the same region is found when interacting with a human is
compared to a control, non-interactive, condition [x, y, z coor-
dinates 4, 31, 41 in Krach et al. (2008), 4, 42, 34 here] while the
interactive game is not competitive but cooperative (prisoner’s
dilemma).
Similarly the right temporoparietal junction was also reported
not only for the contrast between human and control, but as
correlated with anthropomorphism [55, −53, 21 in Krach et al.
(2008), 56, −54, 28 here]. Altogether, response of the main areas
involved in mentalizing, the medial prefrontal cortex and right
temporoparietal junction (Frith and Frith, 1999), reproduced
existing results from the literature, confirming that the induction
of a different stance between interacting with a human inten-
tional agent and with a random number generator was successful.
Region of interest analysis indicated that, of all regions found in
the contrast Int-Rnd, only these two, the medial prefrontal cor-
tex and the right temporoparietal junction, were not significantly
more active in response to the humanoid robot endowed with
artificial intelligence than to the random player. As both regions
play a central role in mentalizing, that is adopting an intentional
stance in an interaction (Frith and Frith, 1999; Gallagher et al.,
2002; Amodio and Frith, 2006), our data clearly demonstrate that
when participants’ belief about the intentional nature of their
opponent was manipulated, brain areas involved in adopting an
intentional stance in a social interaction were not recruited when
interacting with an artificial intelligence.
This raises questions about the absence of specific local brain
activity in the contrast between artificial intelligence and random
player. This absence is not only due to the stringent thresh-
old used, similar to the one used in a previous experiment
(Krach et al., 2008), as the use of a more lenient threshold but
with a masking procedure to exclude regions also responding to
intentional intelligence also failed to reveal any cluster respond-
ing exclusively to the artificial intelligence. While neuroimaging
results clearly support that induction worked for interaction with
the intentional intelligence, they fail to yield significant results for
the interaction with the artificial intelligence. As the same pro-
cedure was used during the briefing for the two opponents, it is
unlikely that induction only worked for the human opponent. It
is also unlikely that participants adopted a similar stance when
playing against the artificial intelligence and the random player,
as one would expect similar differences in Int-Rnd and Int-Art
while these contrasts didn’t yield similar activation patterns.
It is possible that in contrast to mentalizing, that forms the
cornerstone of social interactions from childhood (Frith and
Frith, 1999), and randomness, that can be seen as the absence
of causality or as a folk psychology concept like chance, par-
ticipants did not have an existing representation of what an
artificial intelligence is, how it works, and how to interact with
it. More generally, while a computer and a humanoid robot are
straightforward objects, today’s laymen don’t have a clear repre-
sentation of the inner mechanisms of artificial intelligence, and
therefore can’t develop a cognitive strategy to interact with them.
Alternatively, participants could have adopted different stances
toward the artificial intelligence depending on their personal
views of the inner mechanisms, so that no brain areas would
have survived group analysis. Altogether, these results suggest
that our sample didn’t adopt an intentional stance or any other
type of design stance [e.g., problem-solving reflected in the ante-
rior frontal cortex activity (Badre, 2008), arithmetic calculation
in the intraparietal sulcus (Simon et al., 2002)] when interact-
ing with the artificial agent (Dennett, 1987). A similar conclusion
is supported by the analysis of post experiment questionnaires.
Participants reported that their strategy against the intentional
human was better than against the random agent, suggesting
that they were in different states of mind against the two oppo-
nents and adopted an intentional stance when playing against
the human. In contrast, there was no consensus on their efficacy
against the robot, indicating that there was no consensus between
participants’ subjective perception of their interaction with the
artificial agent.
CONCLUSION
The contrast between playing stone-paper-scissors against an
intentional and a random agent identified brain areas in which we
subsequently assessed the response to a humanoid robot endowed
with an artificial intelligence. Two types of responses were found.
The medial prefrontal and temporoparietal junction responded
exclusively to the human agent, while we observed an increase
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from random to artificial and form artificial to intentional agents
in parietal and lateral frontal areas. If the later result supports
a greater involvement of participants interacting with a natural
than an artificial agent, maybe due to the intrinsically rewarding
nature of social interactions, the former result suggests that men-
talizing is exclusive to the manipulation of mental, compared to
computational, states.
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